

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TIME REQUIRED BETWEEN PHASES

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: VIENNA 1857

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES FURTHER BACKGROUND ON MBFR WG PAPER AND RESPONDS TO USDEL MBFR'S COMMENTS THEREON (REFTEL). SPC MANDATE PROVIDES VALID FRAMEWORK FOR WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS, SINCE ALLIES HAVE NOT REACHED ANY DECISION ON ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES, AND THERE IS NOT REASON TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO HAVE TIME BEFORE BEGINNING PHASE II TO SET UP POST-REDUCTION MACHINERY FOR INITIAL MONITORING OF POST-REDUCTION LEVELS. THERE ARE, IN FACT, CERTAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY MAKE IT DESIRABLE TO OBSERVE HOW SOVIETS BEGIN TO ESTRICTURE REMAINING FORCES BEFORE STARTING PHASE II. END SUMMARY

1. SPC MANDATE TO WORKING GROUP WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE BROAD BASIS FOR WG EXAMINATION OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
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IN TIME BETWEEN PHASES. THIS STUDY WAS UNDERTAKEN, IN FACT, AT SUGGESTION OF U.S. REP, IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF PREMATURE DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION FROM POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE IN SPC. THERE WAS NO REASON TO EXCLUDE FROM WG CONSIDERATION AN EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE

POST-REDUCTION VERIFICATION, SINCE (AS DUTCH REP NOTED IN MARCH 5 SPC DISCUSSION, SEE SEPTTEL) ALLIES MAY WISH TO HAVE INITIAL VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION LEVELS BEFORE BEGINNING PHASE II. PURPOSE OF WG ANALYSIS, IN ANY CASE, IS TO IDENTIFY ALL FACTORS FOR LATER CONSIDERATION AT POLITICAL LEVEL, AND NOT RULE OUT SOME FROM THE OUTSET.

2. MOREOVER, THERE ARE REASONS WHY ALLIES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER SUCH A VERIFICATION TRIAL PERIOD. FOR NATO IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE HOW THE SOVIETS HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN THE TANK ARMY OUT -- ASSUMING THEY HAD AGREED TO DO SO. THE SOVIETS WILL LIKELY REDEPLOY REMAINING UNITS TO FILL IN FOR WITHDRAWN FORCES. THEIR NEED FOR DOING THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY URGENT IF AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY WERE TAKEN OUT IN TOTO. THE ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO MONITOR WHATEVER UNITS FILL RESULTING GAPS; IDENTIFY WHERE THE LATTER WERE REDEPLOYED, AND INSURE THTAT THE NEW FORCE CONFIGURATION FALLS WITHIN THE AGREED RESIDUAL FORCE LEVEL.

3. IN LATTER CONTEXT IS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO INSURE, FOR PHASE II PURPOSES, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT "CHEATED" BY RE-INTRODUCING FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE NGA TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR FORCE RESTRUCTURING, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE -- AS STATED ABOVE -- VERY SHORTLY AFTER THEY HAD WITHDRAWN ANY MAJOR UNITS OF DIVISIONAL OR LARGER SIZE. THE POSSIBLE NECESSITY OF FOCUSING ON SOVIET FORCE RESTRUCTURING FOLLOWING A PHASE I AGREEMENT MAY BE INDICATED BY THE NEED TO A) VERIFY SOVIET GOOD FAITH FROM A POLITICAL STAND-POINT AND B) INSURE FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT THAT IN PHASE II THE ALLIES HAVE AN EXPLICITLY CLEAR VIEW OF THE SIZE AND CONFIGURATION OF SOVIET FORCES FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS. AS A RESULT, VERIFICATION OF POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS COULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES.

4. FOREGOING COMMENTS ARE FOR BACKGROUND AND DO NOT REPRESENT MISSION ENDORSEMENT OF STAFF GROUP PAPER, WHICH WORKING GROUP WILL PRESUMABLY REVISE CONSIDERABLY, OR OF BETWEEN-PHASES VERIFICATION IDEA. IN
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PARTICULAR, WE FIND THE SPECIFIC TIME PREDICTIONS TOO SPECULATIVE AND WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE PAPER FOCUS MORE ON IDENTIFICATION OF MILITARY-TECHNICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN WITHDRAWAL THAN ON SPECIFIC TIMES. PAPER DOES, HOWEVER, REPRESENT A GOOD STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSION IN WORKING GROUP.
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